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Abstract: The stand-up special is growing cultural significance just as it is ma-
turing and becoming more distinct as an art form. Philosophical treatments of the
special are therefore neither frivolous nor redundant. I argue here that such inquiry
can be aided by a definitional account of the ‘special’ and that an essential defini-
tion – if one is available – would serve us best. I then offer a candidate definition
of this kind and reply to some likely objections to it.
Limitless though they could be, philosophical questions about a particular
art form often gravitate toward one of four topics: (a) the extension of the
term we use for the form – i.e. the set of works that are properly considered
instances of the form, (b) the intensional definition of that term, which tells
us how to pick out the members of that set, (c) the form’s ontology, or what
kinds of things its members are, and (d) the evaluative criteria or standards
appropriate to the form. Ontological questions are likely the most interest-
ing philosophically, and evaluative questions the most practical. It may be,
though, that extensional and definitional questions are more fundamental.
After all, we usually want to know what it is we are talking about before we
ask further questions about it.
Some concepts (so to speak) carry their ontology and evaluative criteria
with them, so that determining a thing’s kind, or determining what makes
an instance of that kind good, in effect provides a definition.1 To ask for a
definition of ‘number’ or ‘property’ is to ask into their ontology. And some
terms, like ‘friend’, imply that their instances have satisfied certain success
conditions. We might say, for instance, that ‘a bad friend is no friend at all’.
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Art forms, though, aren’t like any of these. Art forms can share an ontology
with non-art – consider poetry and letters, representational paintings and
advertisements – and there can be both good and bad instances of a form.
So even if our interests are primarily with ontology and evaluation, we may
have reason to independently seek a definition as a first step toward those.
And at least some common ground on extension is required for any profitable
discussion of definition.
An explicative definition – one that is more informative than the merely
stipulative, ostensive, or lexical – may be especially useful in relatively new
and emerging art forms.2 My first ambition here is to argue that this is the
case for the ‘stand-up special’ (hereafter, ‘special’). In that process we’ll have
to discuss a number of likely objections to making any such attempt. I’ll
then make a preliminary case for a particular definition and respond to some
concerns about it.
I. THE EXTENSION OF ‘STAND-UP SPECIAL’
The classical special is immediately recognisable as such. The first thing that
comes to mind is likely a film of a comedian delivering what appears to be
a single continuous performance to a live audience. I say ‘appears’ because
even very standard cases of specials are typically content-edited and pieced
together from multiple performances. There are, however, specials that di-
verge from this prototypical case in any number of ways. There are specials
that interweave additional filmic material such as sketches (Sarah Silverman’s
‘Jesus is Magic’), interviews (Gary Gulman’s ‘The Great Depresh’) or sur-
realistic cut-aways (Chelsea Peretti’s ‘One of the Greats’).3 Other specials
such as ‘The Original Kings of Comedy’ feature more than one comedian.4
Adam Sandler’s ‘100% Fresh’ transparently presents to us a set delivered over
a number of different performances, as does Maria Bamford’s ‘Old Baby’ –
the latter often does so away from typical stand-up settings and sometimes
without an audience.5 A special may also diverge from the norm by virtue
of the content of its performance. We might reasonably wonder or disagree
about whether or not what Andy Kaufman’s specials capture is stand-up
comedy per se.
Films can also closely resemble specials without being members of the
category. First and foremost, not every recording of a stand-up comedy per-
formance is a special. I can’t surreptitiously record a comedian’s set on my
phone and release it as a special. Nor would a comedian’s own recording for
her own evaluative purposes be a special. Fictional films like ‘Funny People’
and ‘Mr. Saturday Night’ prominently feature stand-up sets without being
specials.6 And documentaries about comedians and comedy (‘Joan Rivers: A
Piece of Work’, ‘Why We Laugh: Black Comedians on Black Comedy’) don’t
become specials by virtue of their presentation of actual stand-up sets.7
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So the set of specials has, in addition to its base cases, both borderline
cases and close-but-excluded relatives. We’ll do well to keep this in mind
when we look for a definition that is satisfied by all and only specials. Any
such account will have to avoid both the permissiveness that would obscure
our clarity about core instances and the rigidity that would gloss over the
difficulty we have in deciding about others.
II. WHY DEFINE ‘STAND-UP SPECIAL’?
Just the attempt to define ‘special’ is likely to meet resistance before we get
close to a particular definition. For one thing, the prevalence of intuitively
borderline cases may incite pessimism about a successful definitional account.
But it is just these borderline cases that make a definitional theory worthwhile
– otherwise we could move on to subsequent questions ‘just knowing’ what a
special is.
Also, a rigorous definition may be inappropriate if ‘special’ refers to a
genre rather than an art form. Because the former has more fluid conditions
of application, we would be better off identifying prevalent conventions than
providing a definition. However, the special is more distinct from other kinds
of film than one genre is from another: Notice that genres can be blended
(horror-comedies, sci-fi-westerns, etc.). As in a number of the cases I men-
tioned above, the combination of stand-up with other forms in a film is more
jarring than that, and the components remain more distinct. The effect pro-
duced is more of a hybrid than a blended work.
Perhaps, though, we’ve set the burden of proof on the wrong side. There’s
no need to consider arguments against defining ‘special’ if there’s no affirma-
tive reason to do so in the first place. However, we have at least two reasons to
want such a definition, which in their combination become fairly compelling.8
First, the special is maturing as an art form. As the examples above
indicate, some specials solidify distinct norms and conventions while others
explore the bounds of the form and self-reflectively comment on them. There
is both a mainstream and an avant-garde. And as an art form, the special is
in something like its adolescence. It is old enough to have established classics
and a history on which to draw, but young enough for its innovations and
rebellions against tradition to be more formative than reflective.9
Second, aided by the ascendance of streaming media services – most im-
portantly but not exclusively Netflix – the special is coming into its own as an
art form just as its cultural significance is growing.10 For many of us, a ‘water
cooler’ conversation is now as likely to be about a special as a fiction film,
documentary or serial television program. References to lines, bits, observa-
tions and arguments from specials increasingly provide the kind of shorthand
recognisability that once belonged only to poetry and theater, then to novels,
films, etc.
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Putting these together, we have an art form that is gaining in both dis-
tinctness and significance in an era of unprecedented speed in technological
media development.11 Therefore, understanding the special better is valuable
because of its own significance, but also because it can provide an excellent
pedagogical, experimental and theoretical example of art form development.
And if the special is worth considering, it is worth becoming as clear as we
can about what it is that we’re considering.
III. CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
How clear we can become about what it means for something to be a special
will depend largely on the special’s conceptual structure. On this question
we have useful analogues in the well-trodden debates over the definition of
‘art’. An essential definition – one that provides individually necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions without circularity or other forms of triviality – is
likely to provide us a maximum of combined simplicity, informativeness and
applicability. But not every concept admits of such analysis.
Just as we have institutional and historical definitions of ‘art’, so too
might we define ‘special’ via reference to the particular cultural practices
that surround it or the historical narratives that are true of it.12 Both of
these approaches face a kind of dilemma. On the one hand, we could take
the history or practice of specials as undefined and fundamental, but then we
end up in a potentially trivialising circularity. Specifically, we won’t have the
resources to specify beyond mere pointing which history or which practices
are the relevant ones. But then if we do articulate which history or which
practices are operative, we’ll have a set of conditions that should serve as
their own – and entirely different – definitional account.
Various anti-essentialist theories favour different conceptual structures. A
disjunctive account would provide a set of conditions some combinations of
which are sufficient without any one being necessary.13 A prototype theory
would have us pick out specials via an unspecified similarity to the kind of
base-case specials we discussed earlier.14 Either of these theory-types may
turn out to provide the best account of specials, but in the absence of a
particular account to consider we should notice for now that a disjunctive ac-
count would be more complex and a prototype theory less informative than
an essential definition. The former adds complexity by multiplying the paths
by which something could be a special. The latter diminishes informativeness
by leaving such paths unspecified beyond mere similarity. In between these
could be a resemblance-to-paradigm theory, on which a special is anything
that has enough of certain properties in common with base-cases.15 This sort
of theory, however, would either need to (a) specify precisely which properties
must be common between our base and test cases, but then we’d have an es-
sential definition and could skip the comparison step, (b) allow for a number
of combinations of such properties, effectively collapsing the theory into a
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disjunctive account, or (c) give only a minimal characterisation of the rele-
vant similarities, and thus provide no more useful information than prototype
accounts.
Finally, we may be more skeptical of our prospects for finding any ac-
ceptable definition. Perhaps there are no privileged prototypical cases and no
relevant similarities between specials beyond a meagre ‘family resemblance’.16
Or ‘special’ may be – as the name may suggest – an essentially normative
concept through which we confer approval or advocate for a particular set of
films.
Now it may be that a circular, partial or even skeptical account is the best
we can provide. And while it would be a mistake to decide on a conceptual
structure prior to determining the right account, because of the aforemen-
tioned advantages of an essential definition, we should start there and see if
one is available.
IV. TOWARD A DEFINITION
We want to work our way toward a characterisation of specials that distin-
guishes them from those art forms and media with which they’re most likely
to be confused. Let’s consider, then, some of the distinctions between specials
and these nearby neighbours, starting with other forms of film.
First and foremost, we want to be able to distinguish the special from a
mere audio-visual recording of a stand-up set. While thoroughly teasing out
the difference between the two would raise some thorny ontological issues, it
is enough for our current purposes to notice that the special, unlike the mere
recording, has a distinct identity as an artwork. If there is an artwork in the
mere recording, it is only the recorded set itself. The special may also record
a set that remains a distinct work, but the special has life of its own as a film,
with its own place in an artworld and subject to its own critical standards.
Notice also that specials have names but sets and mere recordings of them
typically do not. Naming a recording of a set may in fact be enough to provide
it with an identity distinct from what it records. If it isn’t, there are things
we could do with the recording (packaging, sharing, selling, etc.) that would
suffice for that sort of distinct identity as a work. But I cannot quite so easily
create a special from a recording I surreptitiously make from the back of a
comedy club. I would at most have a bootleg of the set, not a special. The
performer must authorise a special as such. This authorisation requirement
is especially significant for the evaluation of specials, which involves criteria
distinct from those we would use for either sets or mere recordings of them.
It is also a reason why stand-up sets in fictional films cannot – no matter
how prominent they are in the film – be specials. Fictional characters cannot
authorise anything in the actual world. Fictional characters can at most
fictionally, but not actually, do anything – including authorise the use of
their work in (actual) specials.
55
What is a Stand-Up Special?
We also have certain cinematic expectations of specials we don’t apply to
mere recordings of sets. We expect them to be shot, edited, and mixed in
ways that do more than just document what happened in the club or theatre.
We expect a special to have some distinct cinematographic style. This is not
to say that a special couldn’t look just like (perhaps because it is created
from) a cellphone recording of a stand-up set. But such a special would have
to result from a stylistic choice rather than mere technological necessity.
Nelson Goodman’s distinction between one-stage and two-stage art forms
provides another way of thinking about the significance of cinematography
and editing in specials.17 Printmaking and music are Goodman’s prototypical
cases of two-stage art forms. Producing a matrix or a score may end the
artist’s work, but a printer or musician must do something else in order for
the work to find its final form. Paintings and sculptures, on the other hand,
are complete at whatever moment the artist’s work is complete – one stage.
Stand-up sets themselves could plausibly be one-stage or two-stage works,
depending on their adherence to a prepared routine. That is to say, the
more improvisation a set contains, the more likely we are to think of it as
a one-stage work. What, then, about the special? Here again we have two
possibilities: If the special is a two-stage work, then the director’s role is like
the musician’s and the comic’s like the composer’s (I suppose this could be
a three-stage work depending on the set). If the special is a one-stage work,
then the director must instead be an author contributing in her own right.
It seems to me that the director of a special does not stand in relation to
that work the way a musician does to a musical work. Had another musician
performed a particular piece, it would still be that piece. Had another director
directed a special, it would not still be that same special. Two performances
of a single comedy set may vary quite a bit in delivery the same way that
two performances of a musical piece may differ quite a bit sonically. Two
performances of a special – like two performances of a narrative film – are
of the same special only if they are very nearly identical. We might instead
imagine two directors simultaneously filming two different specials capturing
the same set. The result would be two different specials, not two performances
or productions of the same special. The necessity of the director’s creative
work for the identity of the special means that the special must be a one-stage
work to which the director is a contributing artist.
So here is where I think we find ourselves: a special is predominantly
a recording of a stand-up performance, but not all recordings of stand-up
performances are specials. In order to be a special, that recording must be
distinct in some ontologically robust sense from the performance it records,
must be authorised by the performer in some appropriate way, and must be
subject to some minimal cinematic expectations.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, specials are predominantly record-
ings of stand-up comedy performances and not of other things. We have the
components, then, of a partial definition:
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(i) x is a stand-up special iff x is a distinct, authorised and cine-
matic recording of a stand-up comedy performance.18
If it is to be adequately informative, non-circular and non-trivial we will
need to replace ‘a stand-up comedy performance or performances’ in definition
(i) with a characterisation of such performances. Employing the same strategy
we just used, we can move toward such a characterisation by distinguishing
stand-up performances from others. This will not, of course, distinguish the
special from other presentations of stand-up comedy, including close relatives
like comedy albums. If successful, the cinematic considerations in our partial
definition carry that burden.
First, stand-up performances are not the same as those we find in sketch
comedy or comedic plays. All of these involve storytelling (broadly con-
strued to include the telling of the very short stories we call ‘one-liners’), but
stand-up is dominated by the verbal rather than pictorial or demonstrative
representation of events. True, comedians will often ‘act out’ certain parts of
the stories they tell, but a performance that only or even primarily consisted
of this sort of telling wouldn’t be stand-up per se. We expect that stand-up
comedians do much more telling than showing.
Second, these verbal performances, as opposed to informative lectures or
talks, are successful only when they are funny. There are, of course, many
other good-making properties of stand-up performances. We should prefer
the performance that is resonant, significant, moving, etc. But no matter
what else it is, a stand-up performance that isn’t funny isn’t successful. And
while a lecture may be better for being funny, a lecture can be successful
without being funny. To be clear, I am not suggesting that a performance
must be funny in order to be an instance of stand-up comedy. That would
mean that we cannot have bad stand-up comedy. Rather, my claim here is
that it is characteristic of stand-up comedy that its performances cannot be
good instances without being funny.
Next we need some way of distinguishing the stand-up performance we
see Adam Sandler provide in ‘Funny People’ and the one we see him give in
‘100% Fresh’. The former, we should notice first, is done in-character. It isn’t
Sandler’s set that we’re seeing but his character’s. What we see is, in fact,
not an actual stand-up set so much as the depiction of one. The audience,
the club, the performance are all fictional – even if they would or could be
actual under only slightly changed circumstances. At the same time, though,
we cannot make it a requirement that stand-up must be delivered authenti-
cally. Many comedians adopt stage personas that may be very different from
themselves in personality, attitudes, beliefs, and affect. But a stage persona is
not the same thing as a fictional character.19 The one is adopted for the sake
of performance, the other is performed for the sake of a fiction. It does not
matter if the Adam Sandler that we see in ‘100% Fresh’ is at all like the San-
dler that his friends and family know. In that film he is an actual comedian
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delivering an actual set. Whether comedians are speaking in their own voice
or in the voice of a persona, the utterances that we find in specials are actual
while the utterances in fictional films or plays about stand-up comedians are
fictional.20
We’re now in a position – tentative and provisional though it may be – to
offer a definition of ‘stand-up comedy performance’:
(ii) x is a stand-up comedy performance iff x is a performance of
actual verbal storytelling that is successful only when funny.
Combining (i) and (ii) leads us to:
(iii) x is a stand up special iff x is a distinct, authorised, and
cinematic recording of a performance of actual verbal storytelling
that is successful only when funny.
V. SOME OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
In the very beginning of our discussion I suggested that art forms do not
conceptually carry requirements that their instances must be successful. We
want there to be both good and bad paintings, novels, plays etc. It may seem,
though, that the definition in (iii) above has just such a requirement. There
are two ways, however, that a definition could entail a success condition. It
could imply that the definiendum is properly applied only when certain aims
are achieved. This is how we can say things like ‘a bad friend is no friend
at all.’ Here we have a success requirement. But the definition in (iii) isn’t
like that. It doesn’t carry a success requirement. Instead it defines ‘special’
in part by laying out what a successful instance would have to be. When a
special isn’t funny, it is still a special – in part because its not being funny is
sufficient for it not being successful.
Even if it doesn’t rule out bad specials, we may have concerns about the
necessity of the ‘successful only when funny’ condition. There are at least
two kinds of potential counterexamples. First, a special may serve purposes
entirely unrelated to its quality, and might therefore be considered a success.
Perhaps even an entirely unfunny special could further the career of its come-
dian by virtue of the exposure alone. If this seems implausible, consider Aziz
Ansari’s ‘Right Now’.21 There are jokes, but it is easy to get the impression
that Ansari’s primary objective with the special is to resuscitate his image
and pivot away from a damaging public accusation. The special may or may
not have helped him do this, but I imagine Ansari could count it a success if
it did – regardless of whether or not anyone found it funny. Here we should
distinguish between something successfully serving some aim and it being a
successful instance of its kind. The former does not imply the latter. I might
run for president in the hope of getting to travel and meet new people, but
without any hope or even thought of winning. Here we could say that my
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unsuccessful presidential run successfully served my purposes. It would only
be a successful instance of its kind if it made me president. Similarly, if it isn’t
at all funny then ‘Right Now’ may successfully serve Ansari’s ends without
being a successful special.
Hannah Gadsby’s ‘Nanette’ presents us with a more interesting challenge
along similar lines.22 ‘Nanette’ is, among other things, a series of comments
on stand-up comedy and specials. It is effective at making those statements
which could not have been made as effectively outside of the format of a spe-
cial. It is funny, but that is not obviously necessary for its success. Were it
not funny, it looks like it could still be successful, unfunny and a special, and
so a counterexample to (iii). Here we have a few options. We could respond
as we did before and deny that it would be successful as a special without
being funny, but that it serves other purposes. I think this would be a mis-
take, though, as those purposes are not ulterior to the project of creating the
special. They are, in fact, front and centre in the special itself. We might in-
stead say that ‘Nanette’ is not a special after all, or that we shouldn’t assume
it to be one too quickly. It is as much a philosophical treatment of stand-up
comedy and specials as Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’ is a philosophical treatment of
art status. It is closer then to a work of philosophical performance art that
uses the form of an actual special in the same way that (perhaps) ‘Fountain’ is
a piece of philosophical performance art that takes the form of an object sub-
mitted for consideration as an artwork. I think there is something revealing
about ‘Nanette’ in this claim, but it goes too far. We are no longer defining
a common in-practice sense of ‘special’ when we exclude works like this. The
better response is to insist that ‘Nanette’ would not be successful without be-
ing funny, though not in the straightforward way of more common examples.
Gadsby’s set is successful largely in its ability to make us uncomfortable with
our own comic amusement, forcing us to question the relationship between
comic and audience. This would not be as forceful if we didn’t find it funny.
Because it is a special, its success depends on it being funny, only in this case
the humour is instrumental to a larger – and not ulterior – goal.
The reader may also be concerned that a number of the adjectives I use in
(iii) point to extremely vague predicates, especially ‘cinematic’ and ‘verbal’.
We should not expect any antecedent agreement, for instance, on how much
cinematic style must be employed or how much telling rather than showing is
required for something to count as a special. This is, however, exactly what we
should want. We should look to explain rather than explain away reasonable
disagreement over borderline cases. On this account, we can agree that these
conditions are necessary without agreeing on what it will take to satisfy each
one. It is the latter, I believe, that best accounts for our disagreements over
individual cases.
The previous objections focused on the necessity of each of the conditions
in (iii). We may also worry that they aren’t jointly sufficient. Let’s consider
a potential counterexample to sufficiency that I take to be indicative of many
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similar objections. Say a company puts together a corporate training video
consisting primarily of one person giving a talk to a small assembled group.
The speaker makes a long series of bad, unfunny jokes none of which land
with his immediate audience or anyone watching the video. The jokes are so
bad that they are distracting from the training that was supposed to be going
on, and the messages the company wanted to get to its employees are lost
to annoyance and discomfort. This is a distinct, authorised, and cinematic
recording of a performance of actual verbal storytelling. And had the speaker
been funny, the video would have been successful.
There are at least two available responses to a case like this. First, we
should notice that a speech meant to be funny and a stand-up comedy set
have very different critical standards. The problem in the current case is
that the jokes are so painfully unfunny that they distract from the intended
message. Were they just unobtrusively tolerable the speech and video may
have served its purpose. So while it may have been a success were the jokes
funny, their being funny isn’t strictly necessary for success. On the other
hand, if the jokes themselves are so foregrounded and constant that success
really does depend on their being funny, then I’m not sure that we don’t just
have a bad attempt at corporate messaging via a special.
Finally, the reader may also worry that ‘funny’ is left undefined in (iii)
when it is both central to the account and perhaps less well understood than
the definiendum. Be that as it may, humour has been much more thoroughly
theorised and discussed. If you hold some version of the three principal con-
tending theories of humour - the ‘superiority’, ‘incongruity’ and ‘relief’ theo-
ries – you can substitute that account for ‘funny’ without problem. It seems,
in fact, that any theory of humour unable to be similarly substituted into
(iii) would be lacking. That said, a complete account of these issues would
include a theory of humour. For now, I’m confident that a minimal common
understanding will suffice.
VI. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
I have had two distinct ambitions here. If you’re convinced that seeking a
definitional account of the stand up special is a worthwhile project, we’ve
both spent our time well. If you think the definition I’ve provided is – given
this preliminary argument – on the right track, all the better. In either
case, I expect the importance of these issues to rise along with the cultural
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